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APPELLATE REVIEW OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIMS IN
THE GUILTY PLEA CONTEXT
[C]onstitutional defenses in criminal procedure, like other constitutional rights, are defined by a balance between the interest of the individual and the interest of the state: in this case, we balance the interest
of the defendant in asserting the values protected by the particular constitutional defense at issue against the interest of the state in preserving
its opportunity to obtain a conviction at trial.*
INTRODUCTION
In a series of cases known as the Brady trilogy,' the Supreme Court
recognized the state's interest in the finality of criminal convictions,2
holding that a plea of guilty by a defendant waives his right to collaterally attack his conviction on the ground that it was constitutionally
tainted.3 In subsequent decisions, however, the Court indicated that despite the state's interest in finality, a defendant retains the right to assert
certain constitutional defenses following his plea of guilty.4
* Westen, Away from Waiver. A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional
Rights in CriminalProcedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214, 1238 (1977).

1. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). These three companion
cases, which affirmed the practice of plea bargaining, see infra note 20 and accompanying
text, are commonly referred to as the "Brady trilogy."
2. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
3. See; e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 756-57 (knowing and voluntary plea of guilty "does
not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested on [an
unconstitutional death penalty statute]"); McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 ("[A] defendant who
alleges that he pleaded guilty because of a prior coerced confession is not, without more,
entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus."); Parker, 397 U.S. at 794-95
(guilty plea valid even though the plea was induced by an unconstitutional death penalty
statute and resulted from a prior coerced confession). For discussion of the Brady trilogy, see infra note 15.
A plea of guilty to an offense waives several fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to be tried by a jury, to confront one's accusers, to present witnesses in one's
defense, to remain silent, and to be convicted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J.,concurring); Bishop,
Waivers In Pleas of Guilty, 60 F.R.D. 513, 524 (1974). A plea of guilty also waives all
nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal proceeding. See e.g., United States v. Wray, 608
F.2d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (denial of jury trial), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1048 (1980);
Stanley v. Wainwright, 604 F.2d 379, 380 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979) (constitutional violations
relating to events that occurred prior to the entry of plea), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925
(1980); Wallace v. Heinze, 351 F.2d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1965) (unreasonable searches), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 954 (1966); United States ex rel Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018,
1019 (2d Cir. 1965) (coerced confession), cert denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966).
Before a court can accept a plea of guilty, the judge must determine that the plea is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 1l(d); see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (record in a guilty plea case must contain "an affirmative
showing that [the plea] was intelligent and voluntary"). The judge, however, need not
accept the plea of guilty. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971);
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.ll (1970).
4. See; e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (double
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One such defense is the constitutional right not to be placed in double
jeopardy.' Although most courts agree that double jeopardy is a consti-

tutional right that can be waived, 6 the Supreme Court held in Menna v.
New York' that a waiver of a double jeopardy claim cannot be effected
merely by a plea of guilty.' The Menna Court, however, left open the
question how an appellate court should review a double jeopardy claim

when the defendant has pleaded guilty to the indictment that he later

claims placed him in double jeopardy.9 This issue often arises in cases in
which the defendant pleads guilty to two indictments charging him with
conspiracy and subsequently attacks the second conviction on double
jeopardy grounds."
jeopardy); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974) (due process); see also infra notes
23-37 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. The double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The clause provides three categories of protection: it "protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.
And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). The
clause's protections have been extended to state proceedings. See Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969)).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Herzog, 644 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1018 (1981); Brown v. Maryland, 618 F.2d 1057, 1059 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 878 (1980); Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Perez, 565 F.2d 1227, 1232 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418,
424-25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977); United States v. Young, 503 F.2d
1072, 1074-75 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Buonomo, 441 F.2d 922, 924 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845 (1971). The Supreme Court has declined to hold that a double
jeopardy claim may never be waived. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975)
(per curiam). Moreover, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court
suggested that double jeopardy can be waived by a knowing and voluntary waiver. Id. at
237-38; see also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 35 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(double jeopardy may be waived).
7. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
8. Id. at 62-63 n.2.
9. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
10. See, eg., United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Broce, 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988);
Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47 (lst Cir. 1981). Due to its "peculiar characteristics," the offense of conspiracy presents "special [double jeopardy] problems." United
States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1188 (4th Cir. 1988). Using "artful pleading," id. at
1190, the state can bring successive prosecutions against the defendant "for what is in
reality the same criminal conspiracy, simply by selecting a different set of overt acts for
each indictment." Id. at 1188. "[T]he essence of [conspiracy] is an agreement to commit
an unlawful act." lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975). The precise
bounds of the conspiracy are determined by reference to the agreement and its objectives.
See United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1978). Assessing the validity of
a double jeopardy claim in a conspiracy case is much like putting together a "jigsaw
puzzle." Atkins, 834 F.2d at 432. A single conspiracy "may be established by different
aggregations of proof ... [and] may continue for an extended period of time and involve
the commission of numerous criminal acts." Ragins, 840 F.2d at 1188. In the conspiracy
context, most circuits adopt flexible, multiprong "totality of the circumstances" tests to
determine the number of agreements, and, thus, the number of conspiracies, involved in a
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When the defendant raises his double jeopardy claim before com-

mencement of the second trial, an appellate court's review of that claim

is not limited to the four comers of the indictment.1 ' When the defendant raises his double jeopardy claim after he has pleaded guilty to a second indictment, however, the circuit courts of appeals disagree over the
effect of the guilty plea on the scope of a court's review of the double
jeopardy claim. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit limits review

to the facts and theories stated in the government's indictment,' 2 while
the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits hold that a court,
in assessing the merits of a double jeopardy
claim, may look beyond the
3
contents of the second indictment.'
This Note examines the standard for reviewing a double jeopardy
claim in the guilty plea context. Part I of this Note traces the development of the waiver doctrine in the context of the Supreme Court's guilty

plea cases and identifies the two underlying concerns expressed in those
cases: the state's interest in the finality of criminal convictions and the
defendant's interest in asserting constitutional claims. Part II recommends a standard of review that balances the policies enunciated in the

Supreme Court's guilty plea cases. This Part argues that none of the
circuit courts of appeals that have considered the effect of a plea of guilty
on review of a double jeopardy claim offer a satisfactory rationale and
holding given the Supreme Court's policies. In addressing these congiven case. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 925 (2d Cir. 1988); Atkins,
834 F.2d at 432-33; United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986);
Kerrigan, 644 F.2d at 49. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example,
focuses on eight factors in determining whether the two offenses charged are the same
offense:
(1) The criminal offenses charged in successive indictments; (2) the overlap of
participants; (3) the overlap of time; (4) similarity of operation; (5) the existence
of common overt acts; (6) the geographic scope of the alleged conspiracies or
location where overt acts occurred; (7) common objectives; and (8) the degree
of interdependence between alleged distinct conspiracies.
Rivera, 844 F.2d at 925.
11. Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that on January 1, 1988, the defendant is charged with conspiracy to sell heroin with A, B, and C throughout 1987. He
is tried and convicted. On June 1, 1988, the defendant is charged with conspiracy to sell
heroin with E, F, and G in April, 1987. If the defendant raises a double jeopardy claim at
this point, before the trial, then he bears the initial burden of proving a nonfrivolous
claim while the government bears the ultimate burden of proving that the indictment
charged separate conspiracies. See, eg., United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 434 (5th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 576 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 331-32 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'd on reh'g., 594 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979). In such a case, a court may look beyond the
indictment in its review of the defendant's double jeopardy claim. See, e.g., United States
v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir. 1987) (courts may conduct evidentiary hearings);
Atkins, 834 F.2d at 433 (courts may turn to the indictment, trial testimony, live testimony, investigative documents, signed pretrial statements, transcripts of telephone calls,
assorted business records).
12. See Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1981).
13. See United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 439 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988).
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cerns, the circuit courts fail to balance properly the state's interest in

finality against the defendant's right in asserting his double jeopardy
claim notwithstanding his plea of guilty. This Note argues that unless
the state has relied on the defendant's guilty plea to its detriment, a court
should look beyond the second indictment in its review of a double jeopardy claim.
I.

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY A PLEA OF GUILTY

A.

The Brady Trilogy

In the Brady trilogy, 4 the Supreme Court held that a defendant's
guilty plea may operate to waive his right to raise constitutional defenses

to his conviction, even though the defendant was unaware of these de-

fenses at the time of his plea.' 5 In a subsequent case, Tollett v. Henderson,16 the Court explained that "a guilty plea represents a break in the
14. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). For scholarly criticism and
analysis of the Brady trilogy, see Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney,
and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1975), and Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver
of "PresentBut Unknowable" ConstitutionalRights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy,
74 Colum. L. Rev. 1435 (1974).
15. The Brady trilogy essentially involved two issues: the validity of a guilty plea
induced by an unconstitutional death penalty statute and the validity of a guilty plea
induced by a coerced confession. In Brady and Parker,the defendants had pleaded guilty
in part to avoid the possibility of a death sentence. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
758 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 792-93 (1970). The Brady Court
held that although such a death penalty provision might "needlessly penalize the assertion of a constitutional right," 397 U.S. at 746 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570, 583 (1968)), and is therefore unconstitutional, id., a plea of guilty precludes a
collateral attack upon the conviction. Id. at 757 (a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty
"does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested
on a faulty premise"); see also Parker,397 U.S. at 795 ("an otherwise valid plea is not
involuntary because induced by the defendant's desire to limit the possible maximum
penalty to less than that authorized if there is a jury trial").
McMann addressed whether a defendant may challenge the validity of his guilty plea
on the ground that it was induced by a prior coerced confession. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 760 (1970). The Court concluded that when a defendant's plea of
guilty is based on "reasonably competent advice," a defendant is precluded from attacking his plea on the ground that his counsel misjudged the admissibility of the confession.
Id. at 770-71; see also Parker,397 U.S. at 797-98.
Although a defendant, after entering a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty, may not
collaterally attack his conviction on the ground that the conviction was constitutionally
tainted, he may attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea. McMann, 397
U.S. at 772; see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). In addition, states
may legislate that certain constitutional claims survive a plea of guilty. Lefkowitz v.
Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 293 (1975) (upholding New York statute that allowed some
constitutional claims to survive a guilty plea); see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5 (m)
(West Supp. 1988).
16. 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In Tollett, the defendant, a black man, pleaded guilty to first
degree murder. Id. at 259. Twenty-five years later, he petitioned for habeas corpus,
claiming that he was indicted by an unconstitutionally composed grand jury. Id. at 25960. Although it conceded this constitutional infirmity, the Supreme Court, relying on the
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chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process."' 7 Thus,
where a criminal defendant solemnly has admitted his guilt in open
court, "he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the

deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea."'"
The Brady trilogy founds the waiver-by-guilty plea doctrine on con-

cerns about the finality of criminal convictions and efficiency in the criminal process.19 These decisions affirm the plea bargaining process, 20

recognizing that the plea bargain advances the state's interest in the finality of criminal convictions and conserves prosecutorial resources, in ex-

change for which the defendant receives less than the maximum

penalty.2 1 Thus, a defendant who pleads guilty is precluded from undermining the "mutuality of advantage" by raising constitutional claims in
collateral attacks upon his conviction.'
B.

Blackledge v. Perry: The "'Haling"Limitation

Despite the state's interest in finality, however, Blackledge v. Perry' 3

holds that the Constitution mandates that some constitutional claims
Brady trilogy, held that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty forecloses any inquiry
into the defendant's grand jury defense. I' at 266-67.
17. Id at 267. A guilty plea waives the right to challenge a conviction based on
constitutional infirmities in the proceeding, even if the case would have been decided
differently had the defendant gone to trial. Compare Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266 (guilty plea
waives claim of discrimination in grand jury selection process) with Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 551 (1979) (exclusion of racial groups from grand jury invalidates conviction).
18. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267.
19. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773 (1970); id at 786 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Cover and Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism.: Habeas Corpus and the Court,
86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1070 (1977); Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More
CarefulAnalysis,55 Tex. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1977); Saltzburg, Pleasof Guilty and The Loss
of ConstitutionalRights: The CurrentPrice of PleadingGuilty, 76 Mich. L Rev. 1265,
1274 (1978); Westen, Away From Waiver. A Rationalefor the ForfeitureofConstitutional
Rights in CriminalProcedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214, 1235 (1977); Note, supra note 14,
at 1439; see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("advantages [of the plea
bargaining system] can be secured, however, only if dispositions by guilty plea are accorded a great measure of finality"); Simons, Rescinding a Waiver of a Consitutional
Right, 68 Geo. LJ. 919, 940 (1980) ("guilty plea marks the point after which the government is entitled to rely on the defendant's waiver").
20. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-53 (1970); Cover and Aleinikoff, supra
note 19, at 1069; Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, ProceduralDefaults, and the Burger Court,
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 491 (1978); Westen, supra note 19, at 1216 n.2. The Brady Court
pointed out that the "State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty." 397 U.S. at 750.
21. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752-53. Brady states that "both the State and the defendant
often find it advantageous to preclude the possibility of the maximum penalty authorized
by law." Id. at 752. The defendant limits his exposure to the maximum penalty while
avoiding the practical burdens of a trial. Id The State achieves the objectives of punishment while conserving "scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources." Id The opinion
acknowledges that this "mutuality of advantage" is the reason the majority of "convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty." it.
22. Id at 752-53.
23. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
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survive a plea of guilty. 24 Blackledge limits the Brady trilogy principle
by holding that claims that go "to the very power of the State to bring
the defendant into court" survive a plea of guilty.25 The Court explained
that "the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity" in Blackledge
differed from those in the Brady trilogy and the Tollett case.2 6 In

Blackledge, the defendant was asserting "the right not to be haled into
court at all."' 27 In other words, "[t]he very initiation of the proceedings

operated to deny him due process of law." 28 Thus, the Constitution
mandated that Perry's right to raise in a collateral attack constitutional
29
defenses to his conviction was not waived by his plea of guilty.
The Supreme Court, in Menna v. New York, 30 extended the Blackledge
rule to double jeopardy claims,3 1 permitting a defendant to assert a
...

double jeopardy claim on appeal, despite his guilty plea.32 It held that

where the Constitution prohibits a state from "haling a defendant into
court on a charge,"'3 3 a conviction on that charge must be overturned,
"even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of
guilty."

34

The Menna Court pointed out that the Brady trilogy and Tollett case
24. Id. at 31 (holding that due process defense survives a plea of guilty).
25. 417 U.S. at 30. In Blackledge, an inferior court in North Carolina convicted the
defendant, Perry, of the misdemeanor of assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 22. Perry
filed an appeal in a court of general jurisdiction for a trial de novo. Id. Under North
Carolina law, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-290, 15-177.1 (1969), Perry, who was convicted in
the state district court, had an absolute right to a trial de novo in the state superior court.
Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 22. Before the trial de novo, the state" 'upp[ed] the ante,' "id. at
28, charging Perry with the felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and
inflict serious bodily injury. Id. at 23. Perry pleaded guilty and subsequently attacked his
felony indictment on double jeopardy and due process grounds. Id. The Supreme Court
held that the state, in response to Perry's appeal, had violated his due process rights by
vindictively bringing a more serious charge against him. Id. at 28-29; see also North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969) ("imposition of a penalty upon the defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would
be... a violation of due process of law"). Moreover, the Court held that Perry's guilty
plea did not waive his right to attack collaterally his conviction on due process grounds
through a writ of habeas corpus. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 31. The Court explained that,
like the double jeopardy clause, the due process clause at times "prevent[s] a trial from
taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of a
trial." Id. (quoting Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973)). The Blackledge Court,
in deciding the case on due process grounds, however, did not reach the defendant's
double jeopardy claim. Id.
26. Id. at 30. The Brady trilogy and Tollett case involved what the Court calls "antecedent constitutional violations" or "deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Id. at 29-30 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 266-67 (1973)).
27. 417 U.S. at 30.
28. Id. at 30-31.
29. Id. at 31.
30. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam).
31. Id. at 62 (citing Blackledge).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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do not hold that counseled pleas of guilty waive all constitutional infirmities in the proceeding. 35 Instead, these cases merely stand for the proposition that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is a conclusive
admission of factual guilt that renders "irrelevant" those constitutional
violations that relate to the establishment of factual guilt. 36 The guilty
plea does not bar, however, those claims that prevent the state from obtaining a valid conviction regardless of the defendant's factual guilt.37
C. The Blackledge Standard: The Concern with
Putting the State to its Proof
The Blackledge decision is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme
Court's guilty plea cases. It has puzzled many commentators who struggle to understand the policy justifying the proposition that some constitutional claims survive guilty pleas while others do not.3 8 One possible
35. Id. at 62-63 n.2.
36. The Court explained in a footnote that
[t]he point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of
factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly
removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a
sufficient basis for the State's imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand
in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.
Id at 62-63 n.2 (emphasis in original). The Court obviously meant "consistent" rather
than "inconsistent," since a plea of guilty, which is a conclusive admission of factual
guilt, renders "irrelevant" constitutional violations that conflict with the valid establishment of factual guilt. Westen, supra note 19, at 1223 n.21; see also Saltzburg, supra note
19, at 1278 n.6 9. For a discussion of the problems with the Menna Court's attempt to
explain the Brady trilogy in its footnote, see infra note 38.
37. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam); see Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) ("[Tihe very nature of a double jeopardy claim is
such that it is collateral to, and separable from, the principal issue... [of] whether or not
the accused is guilty of the offense charged.").
38. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 14, at 13-21; Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 1266;
Westen, supra note 19, at 1219-26. Indeed, the Court itself has trouble applying the
Blackledge standard. See Alschuler, supra note 14, at 19 (pointing out that the Court
"has not found a meaningful device for separating claims that should survive a guilty plea
from claims that should not").
The Supreme Court's own attempt to distinguish Blackledge from the Brady trilogy
and Tollett case fails. See Alschuler, supra note 14, at 14-16; Saltzburg, supra note 19, at
1276-79; Westen, supra note 19, at 1227-35. For example, the Blackledge Court explained that none of the underlying claims in Tollett and the Brady trilogy concerned the
power of the state to "hale" a defendant into court. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30
(1974). This explanation is unsatisfactory, however, for as Justice Rehnquist correctly
pointed out in his Blackledge dissent, the state in Tollett also had no "power" to bring a
defendant into court without a valid grand jury indictment. Id at 35 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see Westen, supra note 19, at 1221 (pointing out that "every constitutional
defense should survive forfeiture because every defense that is asserted in a timely fashion
and left uncorrected denies the state the 'power' to convict"); see also Saltzburg, supra
note 19, at 1276.
The Menna Court's attempt to explain the Blackledge decision by distinguishing between constitutional defenses that relate to the establishment of factual guilt and those
that do not also fails. See Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 1279; Westen, supra note 19, at
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explanation for the disparate treatment of these claims is that the

Blackledge decision attempts to balance the state's interest in finality
with the defendant's interest in asserting certain constitutional defenses
notwithstanding his plea of guilty.3 9 Blackledge effects this balance by
identifying "those cases in which to set aside a conviction based on a
guilty plea places the state in no worse a position with respect to its ability to obtain a valid conviction against the defendant at trial than it occupied before entry of the plea."'
In other words, the test of whether a
defendant loses his constitutional claims by pleading guilty is whether
the state has relied to its detriment on the finality of the defendant's
plea.4"
1223, 1232. In Tollett, for example, the defendant asserted a constitutional claim independent of his factual guilt. See Westen, supra note 19, at 1223 ("the right of the
accused to be charged by a process that is free from racial discrimination is a right that
exists without regard to whether the defendant himself is guilty").
One theory suggests that the Court in Blackledge established a "jurisdictional" standard to explain the distinction between waivable and nonwaivable claims. See United
States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 801-02 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Seymour, J.,
concurring
in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988); Alschuler, supra note
14, at 19; Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 478, 501
(1981); Uviller, PleadingGuilty: A Critiqueof Four Models, 41 Law & Contemp. Probs.
102, 112-13 (Winter 1977). As most commentators point out, however, a "jurisdictional"
standard does not adequately explain the Blackledge decision. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra
note 14, at 19; Westen, Forfeitureby Guilty Plea-A Reply, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1308, 133034 (1978) [hereinafter Westen, A Reply]. The obvious problem with characterizing a
claim as "jurisdictional" is that it merely begs the question; such a characterization "is a
conclusion, not an explanation: it does nothing to explain why the defense should be
deemed to survive a guilty plea." Westen, supra note 19, at 1232 n.36.
39. Westen, supra note 19, at 1235-38 (proposing the "reliance theory"); see also Westen, A Reply, supra note 38, at 1321-22. For a critical analysis of Professor Westen's
theory, see Dix, Waiver as an Independent Aspect of Criminal Procedure: Some Comments on Professor Westen's Suggestion, 1979 Ariz. St. L.J. 67. See also Saltzburg, supra
note 19, at 1280-85. Professor Saltzburg suggests a different theory, stressing the defendant's interest in constitutional protections that are designed to relieve criminal defendants
of the burdens and costs of litigation. See Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 1285-89. This
Note, however, adopts Professor Westen's analysis of the Court's guilty plea cases as
offering a more persuasive explanation of the Blackledge standard.
40. Westen, supra note 19, at 1235.
41. Id. at 1237 (state "must be able to claim that by pleading guilty, the defendant
caused the state to change its position to its actual disadvantage"); see also Simons, supra
note 19, at 940 ("guilty plea marks the point after which the government is entitled to
rely on the defendant's waiver"). Detrimental reliance occurs when the state, resting on
the finality of the defendant's plea of guilty, loses the opportunity to present a successful
case against the defendant at trial. Westen, supra note 19, at 1237. For further discussion of reliance by the state, see infra notes 42-49, 71-73, 77-79 and accompanying text.
The state, relying on the guilty plea, may believe that it need not gather evidence or
prepare its case as thoroughly as it would have if the case were going to trial. Westen,
supra note 19, at 1235; see also Simons, supra note 19, at 924-26 (discussing the types of
prejudice that affect the state's interest in the finality of the guilty plea). Moreover,
"[e]ven if [the state] prepares a guilty plea case as thoroughly [as those destined for trial],
it does not preserve the case in a form that is readily admissible against the defendant
should he now choose to go to trial." Westen, supra note 19, at 1235. Thus, the state
may be unable to prove the defendant's guilt at trial should the defendant's original conviction be set aside. 1d. at 1236.
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This "reliance theory," as Professor Westen calls it, would explain

why a defendant who has pleaded guilty retains the right to raise a
double jeopardy claim, as opposed to other claims.42 When the defendant asserts double jeopardy, no valid claim of prejudicial reliance upon

the defendant's plea of guilty can exist, because the state's case was fatally flawed from the beginning and a plea of guilty could not have worsened the case.43 A double jeopardy claim, once asserted, "would stand as
an impassable and insurmountable hurdle between the state and its objective of obtaining a valid conviction.""
With other constitutional claims, however, the court or prosecutor
could have "cured" the violation if given notice.45 A claim that the
grand jury was unconstitutionally composed provides an example." Had
this issue been raised and litigated prior to the defendant's conviction,
the state could have selected a new grand jury and perhaps ultimately

have obtained a valid conviction against the defendant at trial.4 7 When
the defendant waits and raises the claim in a habeas proceeding after the
plea of guilty has been entered, however, he probably has lulled the state

into relying on the guilty plea and not preparing its case as thoroughly as
if it had gone to trial." Thus, the nature of the constitutional defect,4 9 in

terms of the ability of the state to correct it, is dispositive in determining
whether the defendant will be allowed to raise a given claim.

Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the state's interest in finality, ° it is clear that the mere expectation of the state "in the finality of
42. "The Reliance Theory expresses a very simple idea: A criminal defendant should
not lose the freedom to assert a constitutional right except for a good reason." Simons,
supra note 19, at 958; id. at 920 (extending Professor Westen's Reliance Theory to the
rescission of a waiver of a constitutional right). In this instance, the state's detrimental
reliance on the defendant's plea of guilty provides such a reason.
43. Double jeopardy is an incurable defect; "no matter how the state might try to
reconstitute its evidence or reinitiate the charges, it ha[s] no 'power' to [retry] the defendant for the felony over his objection." Westen, supra note 19, at 1226. As Professor
Westen explains, with respect to a double jeopardy claim, "the state can never honestly
allege that it relied to its detriment on the defendant's plea, because an incurable error
invalidates the state's case from the outset: when a state's litigating position is hopeless
from the beginning, there is nothing a plea of guilty can do to worsen it." Id at 1237. In
addition to the Blackledge due process defect and the Menna double jeopardy defect, a
speedy trial claim also should survive a plea of guilty as an incurable defect. See Westen,
A Reply, supra note 38, at 1327 n.67 (no detrimental reliance on guilty plea possible when
defendant asserts speedy trial violation); see also Alschuler, supra note 14, at 15;
Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 1267.
44. Westen, supra note 19, at 1226; see supra note 43.
45. For example, the constitutional defects in the Brady trilogy were curable and
would not have precluded the state "from ever obtaining a valid conviction at trial."
Westen, supra note 19, at 1226 n.29; see also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974)
(pointing out that "[tlhe defendants in McMann v. Richardson ... could surely have been
brought to trial without the use of the allegedly coerced confessions.").
46. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
47. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30; Westen, supra note 19, at 1226.
48. Westen, supra note 19, at 1226; see supra note 41.
49. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
50. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-53 (1970); Cover and Aleinikoff,
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the conviction is insufficient, by itself, to override the defendant's interest
in asserting constitutional defenses." 5 1 For a defendant to lose his right
to assert a constitutional defense, the state must prove that it relied to its
52
detriment on the finality of the defendant's plea of guilty.
D.

Menna and Its Effect on the Standardof Review of Double

Jeopardy Claims in the Guilty Plea Context
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the right of the defendant
to raise certain constitutional claims in the guilty plea context,5 3 it has
not provided a standard for reviewing a defendant's claim of double jeopardy when the defendant raises his claim after he has pleaded guilty.5 4 In

such a standard, a comparison of the facts in both indictments consti-

tutes a crucial step in determining whether double jeopardy exists. 55
In holding that a double jeopardy claim is not waived by a plea of
guilty, 56 the Menna Court explained that "[w]e do not hold that a double
supra note 19, at 1070; Dix, supra note 19, at 195; Saltzburg, supra note 19, at 1274;
Westen, supra note 19, at 1235; Note, supra note 14, at 1439; supra note 19.
51. Westen, supra note 19, at 1237. In the closely analogous area of presentence withdrawal of guilty pleas, various Justices of the Supreme Court have stated that unless the
state has relied to its detriment on the defendant's plea of guilty, a defendant should be
permitted to rescind his plea. Justice Marshall, for example, points out that "[w]here the
government can show specific and substantial harm, the defendant may be held to his
plea. But, ordinarily, the government can claim only disappointed expectations. In such
a case, the balance of interests must favor vindication of the individual's most basic constitutional rights." Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 266 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
see also Neely v. Pennsylvania, 411 U.S. 954, 957-59 (1973) (Douglas, J., with Stewart &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (refusing to accept a concept of irrevocable waiver when the state has not suffered substantial prejudice); Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 267-68 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (finding that absent detrimental reliance, defendant may withdraw his guilty plea).
See generally Simons, supra note 19, at 922-24.

52. See supra notes 41, 51; cf. Simons, supra note 19, at 924 ("prejudice to the government's ability to prove the guilt of the defendant ... provides the strongest ground for
prohibiting withdrawal [of a guilty plea]").
53. See, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam); Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
54. See United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 436-37 (5th Cir. 1987) (Menna Court
left open the question whether a court reviewing a postconviction double jeopardy claim
is limited to the indictment); see also United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 822 (10th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (Doyle, J., dissenting) ("Menna left unanswered the question.., whether
or not a plea of guilty to a charge which is not multiplicious on its face constitutes a
waiver of the double jeopardy claim."), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988); United
States v. Broce, 753 F.2d 811, 818-19 (10th Cir. 1985) (discussing the "loophole" in the
Menna decision that raises the question whether a guilty plea bars defendant from proving double jeopardy claim based on version of facts differing from those stated in the
indictments against him), vacated and reh'g granted, 781 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986) (en
banc).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Jones, 816 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d
792, 797 (10th Cir. 1986) (en bane), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988).
56. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2. (1975) (per curiam).
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jeopardy claim may never be waived. We simply hold that a plea of
guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that--judged on its face-the
charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.""
Menna left open the question whether a plea of guilty to a charge that is
not duplicative of a prior charge on its face constitutes a waiver of a
double jeopardy claim.5" In other words, the question left open after
Menna is whether the Court meant to hold that the defendant does waive
his claim by pleading guilty unless a double jeopardy claim is apparent
when "judged on its face." 5 9 If this holding is the correct one, then review of a double jeopardy claim is limited to the facts and theories of the
second indictment to determine
whether a defendant has been charged
6
again for an earlier crime. 0
The circuit courts of appeals currently dispute whether an appellate
court, in assessing the merits of a double jeopardy claim, is limited to the
facts and theories stated in the government's second indictment. The
Courts of Appeals for the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, reaching different conclusions as to the effect of a guilty plea on a court's review of a
double jeopardy claim, however, failed to address fully the Supreme
Court's concerns as articulated in its guilty plea cases.6 '
II. A

RECOMMENDED STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A

BALANCING APPROACH

The Brady trilogy recognizes the state's interest in the finality of crimi-

nal convictions and upholds the plea bargaining system.6" Other
Supreme Court decisions, however, recognize that the state's interest in
preserving its opportunity to obtain a conviction at trial must be balanced against the defendant's interest in asserting constitutional defenses
notwithstanding his plea of guilty.63 Thus, unless the state has "relied to
its detriment on the finality of the defendant's plea," the defendant may
challenge his conviction on any constitutional ground. 64 This Note argues that courts also should apply a reliance analysis when reviewing
postconviction double jeopardy claims because such claims involve state
and individual interests similar to those implicated in the broader guilty
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id (emphasis added).
See id; supra note 54.
See Atkins, 834 F.2d at 436 (discussing the implications of the Menna footnote).
See id
61. See infra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.

62. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. As Professor Westen has stated:
[Cionstitutional defenses in criminal procedure... are defined by a balance
between the interest of the individual and the interest of the state: in this case,
we balance the interest of the defendant in asserting the values protected by the
particular constitutional defense at issue against the interest of the state in preserving its opportunity to obtain a conviction at trial.
Westen, supra note 19, at 1238.
64. Westen, supra note 19, at 1237.
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plea context. 65 Absent detrimental reliance by the state on defendant's
plea of guilty, no legitimate reason exists, in terms of a state interest, to
restrict review of postconviction double jeopardy claims to the contents
of the second indictment.6 6

The standard for reviewing a double jeopardy claim in the guilty plea
context clearly implicates the state's interest in the finality of criminal
convictions. 67 Although a state cannot bar a defendant's right to raise a
double jeopardy claim, 6s the state has interests to protect in the adjudication of the defendant's claim; arguably, the defendant's plea of guilty and
method of proving his claim may affect the state's ability to disprove the
claim 69 and secure a valid conviction on the second indictment. 70 For
example, the state, relying on the defendant's plea of guilty, may release
witnesses before obtaining depositions from them,7 ' or witnesses may
leave the jurisdiction 71 or may forget important events by the time the
defendant raises a double jeopardy claim.73
The standard for reviewing a double jeopardy claim in the guilty plea
context, however, also implicates the defendant's right to assert his
double jeopardy claim despite his plea of guilty. If a court were to re65. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
66. Cf. Simons, supra note 19, at 923 ("state's prohibition of the assertion of a right
by reason of waiver or forfeiture need only be justified by significant detrimental rcliance"); Westen, supra note 19, at 1237 ("the state's mere expectation in the finality of the
conviction is insufficient, by itself, to override the defendant's interest in asserting constitutional defenses"); supra note 51.
67. By raising his claim after he had pleaded guilty, the defendant made review of his
double jeopardy claim more complicated, foreclosing "development at the time of the
incident of additional facts which would either prove or disprove his claim." United
States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 434 (5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
68. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975).
69. See Atkins, 834 F.2d at 434.
70. See Westen, supra note 19, at 1237 (The Blackledge standard was "designed... to
preserve the state's opportunity to obtain valid convictions at trial."); see also supra note
41.
If the double jeopardy issue is raised pretrial, the defendant merely has to show a
nonfrivolous double jeopardy claim, while the government bears the ultimate burden of
proving the absence of double jeopardy. See supra note 11. When a defendant chooses to
raise his claim after he has pleaded guilty to the indictment, however, courts generally
recognize that the defendant, rather than the state, should bear the burden of proving his
double jeopardy claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Atkins, 834 F.2d at 442; see
also, e.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 279 (1945) ("Petitioner carries the burden in a
collateral attack on a judgment."); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938)
(same); Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977) (same). By pleading guilty, a defendant has "foreclosed development at the
time of the incident of additional facts which would either prove or disprove his claim."
Atkins, 834 F.2d at 434. In addition, "[t]he lack of a record, the passage of time, and the
effect on memory which attends the passage of time" further complicate a court's review
of the defendant's claim. Id. Thus, where the defendant raises his double jeopardy claim
in a habeas proceeding after he has pleaded guilty, a shift in the burden of proof from the
state to the defendant is justified.
71. See supra note 41.
72. See id.

73. United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 434 (5th Cir. 1987).
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strict its review of a double jeopardy claim to the facts alleged in the
second indictment, then the court effectively might foreclose the defendant's ability to prove his claim. 74
A.

The DetrimentalReliance Test

To balance the respective interests of the state and the defendant,
courts should consider whether the state has relied to its detriment on
the defendant's plea of guilty and thereby lost valuable opportunities to
disprove the double jeopardy claim and ultimately to obtain a conviction.
Because the state controls the particularity of an indictment, it must bear
the responsibility for any ambiguities it may contain;"s otherwise, the
right not to be placed in double jeopardy may be undermined by "the
mere forms of criminal pleading.", 76 Thus, two components make up the
detrimental reliance test. First, the method by which a defendant attempts to prove his double jeopardy claim will determine the burden
placed on the government. Second, the particularity with which the government has drafted the indictments will determine whether in good faith
it could have relied on the plea of guilty.
1. Proof of Double Jeopardy by Offering a Version of the Facts
Inconsistent with Those Alleged in the Indictment
When the defendant attempts to prove his double jeopardy claim by
offering a version of the facts inconsistent with those alleged in the second indictment,77 the state, to prevent the defendant from offering this
proof, must establish that in good faith it relied to its detriment on the
finality of the defendant's guilty plea.7" By relying on the facts in the
second indictment to which the defendant pleaded guilty, the state's ability to disprove the defendant's double jeopardy claim may be reduced: in
other words, the state no longer may have the capacity to reconstruct its
case against the defendant, which it must do to rebut the defendant's
74. See Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47, 49 (lst Cir. 1981). The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit restricted its review of the defendant's double jeopardy
claim to the version of facts stated in the second indictment. Id. Thus, the defendant, by
pleading guilty, was deemed to have accepted the government's allegations of two separate conspiracies and could not prove that there was only one conspiracy by offering an
alternative version of the facts. Id.
75. See Atkins, 834 F.2d at 439 & n.11 (quoting United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d
1112, 1119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979)); see also United States v. Baugh,
787 F.2d 1131, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1986) (government's responsibility for drafting a proper
criminal complaint does not shift to defendant when he pleads guilty); United States v.
Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 799 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (McKay, J., concurring) (government cannot undermine the double jeopardy clause using vague indictments), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988); Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614, 624 (4th Cir. 1937)
(vague indictments cannot be used to contravene constitutional guarantees).
76. Atkins, 834 F.2d at 439 (quoting Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614, 624 (4th Cir.
1937)).
77. See, eg., Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1981).
78. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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version of the facts.7 9
In apparent recognition of the state's interest in preserving convictions, 0 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, has held that
a "[defendant's] claim of double jeopardy must be evaluated under the
version of facts stated in the indictment, not against an alternative version of events which [defendant] now claims is more accurate.""1 In
other words, by restricting a defendant's proof of his claim to the facts of
the indictment that, on its face, sufficiently charges two separate conspiracies, the court determines that the guilty plea effectively has waived the
defendant's right to assert his double jeopardy claim."2
The First Circuit fails to recognize, however, that the mere expectation
of the state "in the finality of conviction is insufficient, by itself, to override the defendant's interest in asserting constitutional defenses." 3 The
79. See supra notes 41, 71-73 and accompanying text.
80. The Kerrigan court, citing Brady v. United States, stated that "[b]y pleading
guilty appellants admitted the facts alleged in the information." Kerrigan, 644 F.2d at
49. Presumably, the circuit court implicitly acknowledged the Brady Court's concern
with the state's interest in finality. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
81. Kerrigan v. United States, 644 F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). In
Kerrigan, the defendant, as part of a plea bargaining agreement, pleaded guilty to "two
indictments, both charging conspiracy to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce."
Id. at 47-48. The defendant later claimed that the two indictments in fact described only
one conspiracy and that the second indictment placed him in double jeopardy. Id. at 48.
The Kerrigan court stated that
[b]y pleading guilty, [the defendant] accepted the government's two-conspiracy
allegations, and it is too late for him to try to establish something else. The
factual allegations of the indictments sufficiently charge two separate conspiracies; [defendant] is bound by these facts because of his guilty pleas; and [he] has
therefore not been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense.
Id. at 49.
82. Id.; see United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 436 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing the Kerrigan case); United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 796 n.4 (10th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (dismissing the waiver implications of Kerrigan as dictum), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1073 (1988). The First Circuit's holding seems to be based on a literal interpretation of
the Menna Court's "judged on its face" language. See Atkins, 834 F.2d at 436 & n.8.
The court thus limited the Menna decision, pointing out that although
Menna... [does] indeed indicate that a double jeopardy claim may lie notwithstanding a guilty plea ... [the case does] not hold ... that a defendant who
pleaded guilty may later contest the factual and theoretical foundations of the
indictment to which he pleaded, so as to show that, in fact, he committed only a
single offense.
Kerrigan, 644 F.2d at 49.
83. Westen, supra note 19, at 1237; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in holding that a defendant is limited to the
facts alleged in the indictment in proving his double jeopardy claim, may have placed
unjustified reliance on the Supreme Court's ambiguous footnote. See Atkins, 834 F.2d at
438 (discussing the Menna footnote); see also Westen, supra note 19, at 1225 ("[I]n disposing of Menna summarily, the Court did not give the footnote the attention it deserved
and ... on further reflection, the Court will reject or ignore it."). It is unlikely that the
Court would use a negative implication to hold that a defendant waives his double jeopardy claim unless the claim is apparent from the face of the indictment. Atkins, 834 F.2d
at 437. The Kerrigan court's failure to consider properly the defendant's interest may
derive from the fact that the court failed to consider the Blackledge decision in its analy-
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state should not be allowed to assert its interest in finality until it can
show that it relied to its detriment on the guilty plea." To hold other-

wise effectively eliminates the defendant's right to raise constitutional defenses without compelling reason.

In recognition of the defendant's constitutional right to raise a double
jeopardy claim, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expressly has

rejected the First Circuit's restrictive standard for reviewing double jeopardy claims in the guilty plea context.8 5 The Tenth Circuit has held that
the admissions of factual guilt subsumed in the pleas of guilty go only to
commission
of particular acts and not to whether one or more conspira86
cies exist.
The decision suggests that the defendant, in support of his double jeopardy claim, not only may offer an alternative version of the facts alleged

in the indictment, but that the defendant also may offer facts that contra-

dict those alleged in the second indictment.8 7 The Tenth Circuit, however, may have placed too much emphasis on the "jurisdictional"
language of the Blackledge and Menna decisions. 8 Its view clearly consis. See Brace, 781 F.2d at 796 ("Since Blackledge is the keystone in the issue of waiver
under consideration... Kerrigan cannot be regarded as persuasive authority."). Moreover, it neglected to recognize that "admissions of factual guilt subsumed in the pleas of
guilty go only to the acts constituting the conspiracy and not to whether one or more
conspiracies existed." Atkins, 834 F.2d at 436-37 n.8 (quoting United States v. Broce,
781 F.2d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988)).
Thus, a court should not restrict its review of a double jeopardy claim to the contents of
the second indictment.
84. See supra notes 41, 66 and accompanying text.
85. United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
86. I& (citing Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978)). In Brace,
defendants pleaded guilty to two indictments charging conspiracy to violate the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Id. at 793-94. One year later, the defendants claimed that the second
indictment duplicated the first, placing them in double jeopardy. Id.
The Broce court dismissed the Kerrigan holding that "a defendant who pled guilty
cannot be permitted to make arguments 'inconsistent with the factual and theoretical
foundations of the indictment'" as unpersuasive and inapposite. Id. at 796. The Brace
court construed the Menna decision much more broadly than did the Kerrigan court:
As already noted in Menna . . . the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause
stands as an inhibition upon the government's right to institute charges. This
inhibition is absolute, and even though the bar works as a protection of individuals, it does not constitute an individual right which is subject to waiver. If the
absence of constitutional authority prevents the government from instituting
charges in the first instance, a defendant's guilty plea cannot confer authority
upon the government to do what the Constitution prohibits. In light of this
fundamental constitutional concept, the doctrine of waiver has no significance.
[dk at 795.
87. See id. ("In light of [the double jeopardy clause], the doctrine of waiver has no
significance."); see also id. at 796 ("[T]he government was without power to institute one
of the charges upon which the plea agreement was based. In effect, that agreement was
partially founded upon a nullity.").
88. The Brace court, for example, noted that "the essential right" in this case was the
"right not to be haled into court at all." 781 F.2d at 795 (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21, 30 (1974)). In addition, the court stated "that the government was without
power to institute one of the charges upon which the plea bargain was based [and that] the
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tradicts Supreme Court precedent, which recognizes the state's legitimate

interest in the finality of criminal convictions.8 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted a case-by-case
approach to determine whether a court should look beyond the indictment in assessing a defendant's postconviction double jeopardy claim. 90

It has held that, although "Menna does not limit a court's examination
to the indictment," it will not always be necessary or appropriate to look
beyond the indictment. 9 1 The court's principal concern was that "the
freedom which the government has in drafting
an indictment" 92 might be
93
used to undermine constitutional rights.
When the state drafts an indictment with vague allegations, the Fifth

Circuit resorts to extrinsic evidence to help "flesh-out" the charges in the
indictment.9 4 When the indictment is sufficiently detailed and specific,

however, the Fifth Circuit does not allow the defendant to present any
evidence outside that contained in the indictment.9 5 The approach

adopted by the Fifth Circuit fails to vindicate any legitimate state interest, however, when the state has not suffered a reduction in its ability to
agreement was partially founded upon a nullity." Id. at 796 (emphasis added). As noted
earlier, a "jurisdictional" standard is inadequate as an explanation of the Supreme
Court's policies in the guilty plea cases. See supra note 38.
89. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The court's reading of Menna as placing an absolute bar against waiver of double jeopardy claims clearly is overbroad. See
United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 799-805 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Seymour, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that the Supreme Court consistently has approved of knowing and voluntary waivers of constitutional rights), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988). The Supreme Court itself has declined to hold that a
double jeopardy claim may never be waived. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2.
Moreover, the majority of the circuit courts addressing this issue have concluded that a
double jeopardy claim may be waived. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The Broce court, in protecting the defendant's right to assert his double jeopardy claim
does not acknowledge the legitimate interest of the state in the finality of a defendant's
conviction. See Broce, 781 F.2d at 795. Indeed, it rejects the argument that allowing
defendants collaterally to attack their conviction "'long after their guilty pleas are entered... [would undermine] the finality of convictions and [increase] the already heavy
workload of the federal courts.'" Id.; see also id. at 796 ("As a matter of immutable
principle, the government's constitutional inability to charge in the first instance is not
diminished simply because it bargained away a prosecutorial advantage.").
90. See United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1987). In Atkins, the
defendant pleaded guilty to an Oklahoma indictment that charged conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine and phenylacetone. Id. at 427-29. A few months later, the defendant pleaded guilty to a Texas indictment that charged conspiracy to manufacture
amphetamine. Id. at 428-29. The defendant subsequently attacked his sentence for the
Texas conviction on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 429. In considering the effect of the
defendant's guilty plea on a court's review of his double jeopardy claim, the Atkins court
held "that Menna does not require us to look only to the indictment when reviewing a
double jeopardy claim which follows a guilty plea." Id. at 439.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 440.
95. Id. at 442.

19881

DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIMS

prove the commission of the offenses.9 6 Until the state establishes detrimental reliance, there is no good reason to limit a defendant's proof of
his double jeopardy claim to the four comers of the indictment.
2.

Particularity of Factual Pleadings in an Indictment

The possibility that the state relied to its detriment is even more likely
in cases where the state drafts a detailed indictment to which the defendant pleads guilty. In such a case, the state can claim in good faith that
the guilty plea prejudiced its ability to disprove the defendant's double
jeopardy claim. If the admitted facts in both indictments "paint separate
and distinct pictures which rule out the reasonable possibility of a double
jeopardy problem," 97 then a court should rely solely on such facts alleged
in the 98
second indictment when reviewing the defendant's double jeopardy
claim.

When the government pleads an indictment with vague allegations,
96. See Westen, supra note 19, at 1237 (mere interest of the state in finality is not
enough to override defendant's right to assert constitutional defenses); see also supra note
51 and accompanying text.
97. United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 439 (5th Cir. 1987).
98. Id at 440 ("Resort to evidence outside the indictment ...will be both unnecessary and inappropiate."). An example of such indictments can be found in Kerrigan v.
United States, 644 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1981).
The first indictment, No. 77-398, read in part as follows:
'During the period beginning on or about August 25, 1977, and continuing
through on or about September 1, 1977, in the District of Massachusetts, de-

fendants JOHN PAUL KERRIGAN, RICHARD KIRKWOOD, and BENJAMIN A. LAMBERT, did unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly combine,

conspire, confederate and agree with each other and amongst themselves to
commit offenses against the United States, as follows:
'To transport and cause to be transported in interstate commerce goods and
merchandise, to wit: lithographs with a value in excess of $5,000, which had
been stolen from the Pucker-Safrai Gallery, Newbury Street, Boston, Massachusetts, knowing the same to have been stolen: in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 2314.'
Id at 48 n.1. The second indictment, No. 77-399, read in part as follows:
'During the period beginning on or about September 1, 1977, and continuing
through on or about September 22, 1977, in the Districts of Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, defendants JOHN PAUL KERRIGAN and RICHARD
JOHN KIRKWOOD, did unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with each other and amongst themselves to commit offenses against the United States, as follows:
'To transport and cause to be transported in interstate commerce goods and
merchandise, to wit: Indian jewelry with a value in excess of $5,000, which had
been stolen from the shop of Etta Goodstein, West Dennis, Massachusetts,
knowing the same to have been stolen; in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 2314.'
Idoat 48 n.2. Although the Kerrigan holding, restricting review of the double jeopardy
claim to the version of the facts in the second indictment, id. at 49, is erroneous, see supra
note 83 and accompanying text, the result in the case is correct, assuming that the State
had relied detrimentally on the defendant's plea of guilty. The indictments were specifically drafted, charging two distinct offenses. See Kerrigan, 644 F.2d at 49; see also United
States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (court distinguishes the
Broce case from the Kerrigan case, pointing out that in Kerrigan, the indictments specifi-
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however, the state cannot claim in good faith that it relied to its detriment on defendant's plea because it controls the particularity of an indictment.9 9 In such a case, there should be a presumption against
prejudicial reliance. Moreover, when the indictment is vague and blurs
the factual elements of the crimes, 1" then the defendant cannot be said

to have admitted the commission of two different crimes.101 Thus, the
defendant, in proving his double jeopardy claim, may offer an alternative
version of the facts to color the version alleged in the second
indictment. 102
cally alleged separate conspiracies), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988). The Kerrigan
court, however, did not expressly address the issue of reliance by the state.
99. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Baugh, 787 F.2d
1131, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1986) (court rejected government's argument that even though
indictment was deficient, it relied to its detriment on the defendant's guilty plea because
"it 'might' have discovered or adduced the missing proof"); McFarland v. Pickett, 469
F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir. 1972) (where the government alleged one offense, the defendant's plea of guilty did not constitute an admission of two offenses, even though the government asserted that evidence proving separate offenses could have been found but for
defendant's plea).
100. An example of vague indictments is found in United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d
426 (5th Cir. 1987).
The first indictment charged:
That from on or about April, 1982, and continuously thereafter up to and
including April 13, 1983, in the Western District of Oklahoma, the Northern
District of Texas, and elsewhere
Richard Lee Atkins;
Joe Dewayne [sic] Snyder;
Roger Ray Helvy;
Leiann Lynda Gill;
and Kenneth Randle Gill;
the defendants herein, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together, with each other, and with diverse other persons whose
names are to the Grand Jury unknown, to manufacture Phenylacetone and Amphetamine, Schedule II non-narcotic controlled substances, in violation of Title
21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).
Id. at 428. The second indictment charged:
That beginning on or before March 30, 1983, and continuing until April 12,
1983, in the Western District of Texas and divers [sic] other places to the grand
jurors unknown, Defendant,
Richard Lee Atkins,
and other persons to the grand jurors known and unknown, unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and
with each other [to] manufacture amphetamine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance, contrary to Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1) and in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 846.
Id.
101. See United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 804 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988);
cf McFarland v. Pickett, 469 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir. 1972) (where government had the
responsibility of drafting the indictment and alleges that only one offense occurred,
"[d]efendant's plea of guilty.., could not, therefore, constitute an admission of guilt of
two offenses").
102. See United States v. Atkins, 834 F.2d 426, 440 (5th Cir. 1987) (when vague indictments overlap, suggesting a double jeopardy problem, extrinsic evidence should be
used to "flesh-out the charges in the indictments").
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Courts correctly have acknowledged the implicit danger in pleading
"indictments which vaguely refer to agreements 'beginning on or before'
or 'continuing from' a certain time, made in one or two named jurisdictions and 'elsewhere,' between the person indicted and 'other persons to
the grand jury known and unknown.' "103 Such vague pleadings may
nullify the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.' 4 Thus,
the state, and not the defendant, "should bear the responsibility for any
ambiguities" in the indictment. 0 5 When the indictment is vague, the
defendant should be allowed to present a fuller and more developed version of the facts alleged therein." 6
CONCLUSION

In reviewing a double jeopardy claim that follows a plea of guilty,
courts should consider the effect of the plea of guilty on the state's ability
to disprove the double jeopardy claim and ultimately obtain a valid conviction. They also should keep in mind the freedom that the state exercises in drafting an indictment and the possibility that such freedom may
nullify the constitutional right not to be placed in double jeopardy.
This Note suggests a standard that balances the state's interest in finality against the defendant's interest in asserting his double jeopardy claim.
Unless the state has relied to its detriment on the defendant's plea of
guilty, a court should look beyond the indictment in assessing the merits
of a double jeopardy claim. When the state drafts a detailed indictment,
it can always show in good faith that a guilty plea has prejudiced its
ability to prove the commission of two crimes. When the state drafts a
vague indictment, however, there can be no good faith claim of detrimental reliance. By adopting the approach recommended in this Note,
courts will insure that the respective interests of the state and the defendant will be protected and advanced.
Augustine V Cheng
103. Atkins, 834 F.2d at 439; see e.g., Broce, 781 F.2d at 804; United States v. Mallah,
503 F.2d 971, 985 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 420 U.S. 995 (1974); Short v. United States, 91
F.2d 614, 624 (4th Cir. 1937).
104. See Short, 91 F.2d at 624; see also United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1190
(4th Cir. 1988); Atkins, 834 F.2d at 440. For example, the state might indict the defendant for a second conspiracy "by charging the conspiracy to have been formed in another
district where overt acts in furtherance of it were committed, or by charging different
overt acts as having been committed in furtherance of it, or by charging additional objects
or the violation of additional statutes." Short, 91 F.2d at 624. See supra note 10 (discussing double jeopardy problems presented by charge of conspiracy).
105. Atkins, 834 F.2d at 439 n. 11 (quoting United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112,
1119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979)); see supra note 75 and accompanying
text.
106. Atkins, 834 F.2d at 440.

